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Abstract
We consider strategic voting in sequential committees in a common value setting
with incomplete information. A proposal is considered against the status quo in
one committee, and only upon its approval advances for consideration in a second
committee. Committee members (i) are privately and imperfectly informed about
an unobservable state of nature which is relevant to their payos, and (ii) have
a publicly observable bias with which they evaluate information. We show that
the tally of votes in the originating committee can aggregate and transmit relevant
information for members of the second committee in equilibrium, provide conditions
for the composition and size of committees under which this occurs, and characterize
all three classes of voting equilibria with relevant informative voting.
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Voting of bills in bicameral legislatures has a sequential structure: a bill is originated in one
chamber, and passes to the other chamber for consideration only after having been voted by
a (possibly qualied) majority of representatives on the oor. This sequential arrangement
of committees is in no way unique to bicameral legislatures. Still in the legislative arena,
bills are typically considered by the oor of legislative bodies only after being approved by
a majority of votes in the relevant standing committee. The decisions of Appeal Courts
can then be elevated to the Supreme Court for consideration.1 And in universities, faculty
appointments typically require the approval of an \administrative" committee following
the approval of a committee composed of faculty members of the relevant department.2
A stylized fact common to all these examples is that the outcome of the vote in the rst
committee can inuence the outcome of the vote in the second committee beyond the binary
decision of whether to approve or reject the alternative in the rst committee: the larger
the tally of votes in favor of the proposal in the initiating committee, the highest its success
rate in the receiving committee.3 The starting point of this paper is to propose a simple
explanation for this stylized fact. If committee members have private information about
the relative value of the alternatives under consideration, voting outcomes can aggregate
and transmit relevant information to members of the receiving committee. What is less
straightforward is whether members of the originating committee will have incentives to
vote informatively in equilibrium, and if so under what conditions. Which compositions
and sizes of committees facilitate or hinder the transmission and aggregation of information
in this environment?
To assess these questions, we develop a simple model of strategic voting in sequential
committees in a common value setting with incomplete information. The model builds
on the seminal contributions of Austen-Smith and Banks (1996), and Feddersen and Pe-
sendorfer (1997, 1998). As usual in the literature, committee members are privately and
imperfectly informed about an unobservable state of nature which is relevant to their pay-
os. Here, however, voting does not occur in single-committee systems. Instead, a proposal
1I thank Barry Weingast for suggesting this interesting application.
2Maug and Yilmaz (2002) consider the case of reorganization proposals under the U.S Federal
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, where claim holders are divided into classes, and decision-making appears
to be simultaneous between committees.
3As Oleszek (2004) notes regarding committees in the U.S. House of Representatives, \Bills voted out
of committee unanimously stand a good chance on the oor. A sharply divided committee vote presages
an equally sharp dispute on the oor (pg. 102)"
1can prevail only by defeating the status quo by (possibly qualied) majority voting rst in
one and, provided it is successful there, then in a second committee (whose members, we
assume, can observe the vote outcome in the initiating committee).
What does and what does not change vis-a-vis the standard single-committee setting?
Note rst that the strategic problem of members of the receiving committee is essentially
the same as that of members of a single committee: in deciding their vote, individuals
of the receiving committee care only about the event in which they are pivotal, and they
are pivotal in the traditional sense of being the decisive vote in a divided committee (the
standard-pivotal motive). The possibility of observing the outcome of the vote in the orig-
inating committee, however, introduces two main dierences in the incentives of members
of both committees. First, members of the receiving committee can condition their behav-
ior on the realization of votes in the originating committee. When some members of the
originating committee vote informatively, the tally of the votes in favor of the alternative
becomes an informative public signal for members of the receiving committee, allowing
dierent voting strategies to be equilibria in the second committee for dierent voting out-
comes in the rst committee. Second, as opposed to members of the receiving committee,
members of the originating committee can inuence the outcome both in the traditional
sense of killing or passing the proposal in their committee, and by inuencing the beliefs
of members of the receiving committee regarding the relative value of the two alternatives
(what we call the signal-pivotal voting motive).
We show that there are two classes of voting equilibria in which the tally of votes in favor
of the proposal in the originating committee transmits relevant information to members of
the receiving committee. In the rst class, the receiving committee unconditionally (inde-
pendently of the private information of its members) kills the proposal following suciently
low vote tallies in the originating committee, and unconditionally approves the proposal
otherwise. In equilibria of this class, informative voting occurs only in the originating
committee; the second committee acts only to raise the hurdle that the alternative has to
surpass in the rst committee to defeat the status quo in equilibrium. As a result, the
strategic problem of members of the originating committee resembles that of members of
a single committee: their vote decision is guided by the standard-pivotal voting motive, as
amended by the endogenous majority rule implied by the equilibrium behavior of members
of the receiving committee. We call equilibria of class endogenous majority rule (EMR)
voting equilibria.
The second class encompasses voting equilibria in which not only members of the orig-
inating committee vote informatively, but so do - following some realizations of the vote in
2the originating committee - members of the receiving committee. In particular, we show
that in any equilibrium of this class there is a responsive set of initiating-committee voting
outcomes in which the probability of the proposal being accepted increases (strictly) with
the tally of votes in favor of the proposal in the originating committee. This occurs for
example when the number of individuals voting informatively in the receiving committee
increases with higher tallies as a result of individuals switching from voting against the
proposal unconditionally to voting informatively.4 As a result, in voting equilibria with rel-
evant two-sided informative voting (TSI), the voting behavior of members of the originating
committee is guided by a signal-pivotal motive.
Voting equilibria with transmission of information between committees have to be of one
of the classes above. But under what conditions, if any, do EMR and two-sided informative
voting equilibria exist? What in particular are the implications for the size and composition
of committees? We address these questions in a setting that allows for open conicts of
interests between committee members: individuals are biased for or against the status quo,
and this bias is public information. The distinction boils down to a dierent threshold with
which individuals of dierent types evaluate information: conservatives - those biased for
the status quo - require overwhelming evidence in favor of the proposal to prefer it over the
status quo, and similarly liberals require overwhelming evidence against the proposal to
favor the status quo.5 To make this distinction meaningful, we assume that an individual's
own private information can never overturn the preference between alternatives implied by
the bias.
In this setting, we establish existence of EMR and TSI voting equilibria for plausible
conditions on the size and composition of committees. We show that a key determinant
for existence of equilibria of these classes is the \partisan" (ideological) composition of the
receiving committee, and specically whether conservatives can or can not block the passage
of the proposal in the receiving committee. When they can, there is always an EMR voting
equilibrium with k conservatives in the originating committee voting informatively as long
as the total number of conservatives in the originating committee is suciently large. When
instead liberals are a winning coalition in the receiving committee, an equilibrium of this
class can only exist if liberals are a winning coalition in both committees. Moreover, when
this exists, the number of informative votes is bounded above by the majority premium of
4Alternatively, this occurs when the number of informative votes decreases with higher tallies as a result
of individuals switching from voting informatively to voting for the proposal unconditionally.
5This is essentially without loss of generality, as we can capture the common interest case allowing for
one type only.
3liberals in the originating committee.
Endogenous Majority Rule voting equilibria have attractive properties - they are ex-
tremely simple and also robust to sequential voting within each committee - but they are
also inecient, as no information from members of the receiving committee is incorporated
in the collective decision. Third, then, we show that under some conditions the relevant
majority can do better than in the most informative EMR voting equilibrium by simply
delegating all relevant decision making to the receiving committee. For simple majority
rule, in particular, the condition boils down to a comparison between the majority premium
of liberals in each committee when liberals are a winning coalition in the receiving com-
mittee, but between the majority premium of conservatives in the receiving committee and
the total number of conservatives in the originating committee when instead conservatives
are a blocking coalition in the receiving committee.
Finally, we address existence of TSI voting equilibria. We show that for an equilibrium
of this class to exist it is sucient that conservatives form a blocking coalition in the
receiving committee and that the number of conservatives in the originating committee is
suciently large. We also show, however, that there can exist a voting equilibrium with
relevant two sided informative voting in which each of a small number of conservatives in
the originating committee votes informatively. Moreover, this strategy prole remains an
equilibrium when voting within each committee is allowed to be sequential as well. Last,
we show that if we require TSI voting equilibria to be robust to sequential voting within
each committee, then if liberals are a winning coalition in the receiving committee, liberals
must also be a winning coalition in the originating committee for a TSI voting equilibrium
to exist. Thus also in this class it is key whether conservatives can or cannot block the
passage of the proposal in the receiving committee.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we discuss the relation with the lit-
erature. In section 3, we describe the model. In section 4, we formalize the notions of
standard-pivotal and signal-pivotal voting motivations, and characterize the equilibria of
our model in the single-committee benchmark. Section 5 contains the main results of the
paper. Section 6 concludes. All the proofs are relegated to the appendix.
2 Relation with the Literature
This paper builds on the pioneering contributions of Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) and
Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997, 1998), and connects at least three strands of related
research.
4First, Piketty (2000) and Razin (2003) also build around the idea of voting as commu-
nicating in a common-values setting, where voters have some type of signal-pivotal voting
motive. In Piketty (2000), however, there are two outcomes corresponding to two stages
of choices (an electorate chooses by plurality rule between two alternatives, the winner is
implemented for one period, and then competes against a third alternative to be imple-
mented in a second period), and the focus is on the ineciency caused on the intermediate
choice by the desire of voters to communicate information relevant to the second choice.
In our sequential committees the problem faced by voters in the rst committee is very
dierent from this, as the alternative approved by the rst committee does not become an
outcome until also approved by the second committee, and thus the intermediate stage of
payos simply does not exist. In Razin (2003), on the other hand, there is only one stage
of voting, but the elected candidate uses the outcome of the vote to select the policy she
will implement, in a single dimensional policy space. This richer space allows the outcome
to be strictly responsive to the tally of votes for the winner in the election. In our setting,
instead, this responsiveness comes with the probability of the proposal being passed in the
receiving committee being increasing in the tally in the rst committee.6 More recently,
Shotts (2006), and then Meirowitz and Shotts (2007) and Hummel (2007) also consider
pivotal and signaling motivations in a model of voting with private values (the informa-
tion transmitted here is about the location of the median voter in a unidimensional policy
space).
Our paper also relates to several papers exploring an alternative kind of sequentiality
in voting in committees. In Dekel and Piccione (2000), as in Fey (1998), Wit (1997),
Battaglini (2005), Battaglini, Morton, and Palfrey (2007), Callander (2007), and Ali and
Kartik (2006), the focus is on sequential voting among members of a single committee:
individuals can vote after observing prior votes by other voters in the population, but
all votes are then aggregated in the same tally and the collective choice is determined
by majority rule. None of these papers, however, considers sequential voting between
committees. The two approaches provide complementary lessons for the study of hybrid
systems lying in between these models, as that employed in the US presidential primaries.
Third is the also very closely related paper by Maug and Yilmaz (2002), which studies
simultaneous voting in two committees in a setting similar to the one considered here
6In both of these papers, a rst stage of voting communicates information for a second stage relevant
to the determination of policy. A similar phenomenon arises in this regard when players can explicitly
deliberate prior to a voting stage. For models of voting with deliberation, see Coughlan (2000), Austen-
Smith and Feddersen (2005), Austen-Smith and Feddersen (2006), and Gerardi and Yariv (2007). We
return to the possibility of deliberation in the discussion.
5(committees, however, are internally homogeneous, divided by type of voter). While the
two papers are clearly complementary, simultaneous voting among committees leads to
very dierent voting incentives to those faced by individuals in our setting, as there is no
role for signaling to members of the receiving committee, and no way to condition behavior
on history of play.7
Finally, this paper contributes to the literature on transmission of information from
(standing) committees to the whole assembly pioneered by Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987).
Gilligan and Krehbiel build - as do to our knowledge all subsequent contributions in the
literature - on the seminal contribution of Crawford and Sobel (1982), and as a result treat
both the committee and the oor (our originating and receiving committees) as unitary
actors with the preferences of the respective median voters. Our analysis suggests that
this assumption can be quite problematic. We do not handle here however information
acquisition. This is a natural (and interesting) extension of the model that we leave for
future research.
3 The Model
A group of individuals arranged in two committees, C0 and C1, choose between a proposal A
and a status quo Q, both lying in an arbitrary policy space X. Committee Cj is populated
by an odd number nj of individuals, and the collective choice of each committee j is
determined by voting under a Rj-majority rule without abstention. Formally, letting vi 2
f 1;1g denote i's vote against ( 1) or in favor (1) of the proposal, t(vj) 
P
i2Cj vi the
net tally of votes in favor of the proposal in Cj, and zj 2 fQ;Ag the policy choice in
Cj, zj = A if and only if t(vj)  rj, for an odd integer rj such that 1  rj  nj (thus
Rj =
nj+rj
2 ). Voting is simultaneous in each committee, but sequential between committees.
In particular, we assume the following simple institutional environment: the alternatives
are rst voted on in the originating committee C0. If the proposal defeats the status quo
in the originating committee, the alternatives are then voted on in the receiving committee
C1. The proposal is adopted if and only if it defeats the status quo in both committees,
tj(vj)  rj for j = 0;1, and otherwise the status quo remains.
There are two equally likely realizations of an unobservable state of the world, ! 2
7The emphasis in Maug and Yilmaz (2002) is on the eciency comparison of unicameral and (simulta-
neous) bicameral systems, and not on the positive or behavioral properties. We address this in a separate
paper, now in progress. The comparison of unicameralism and bicameralism calls a much broader litera-
ture to the one we can review here (but see Tsebelis and Money (1997), Cutrone and McCarty (2005), and
references within).
6f!Q;!Ag, and each individual i 2 Cj receives a private, imperfectly informative signal si 2
f 1;1g, distributed independently conditional on the state, such that Pr(si = 1j! = !A) =
Pr(si =  1j! = !Q) = q > 1=2 (the restriction to uninformative priors is without loss of
generality). Individuals' preferences have an ideological and a common value component.
Each individual i 2 Cj has a publicly known ideology bias either for or against the proposal,
and we say that i is either a liberal or a conservative, respectively. Liberals and conservatives
dier in their ranking of alternatives conditional on observing the same information. In
particular, liberals prefer the proposal to the status quo whenever Pr(! = AjI) > A for
some A < 1=2, while conservatives prefer the proposal to the status quo whenever Pr(! =
AjI) > Q for some Q > 1=2. More formally, we normalize the payo for both types if the
proposal is not passed to zero, and denote the payo of an individual of type b 2 fQ;Ag if
the proposal passes in state ! by U!
b , with UA
b = 1   b > 0 and U
Q
b =  b < 0. Thus the
individual wants the proposal passed given I if Pr(!AjI)[1   b] + [1   Pr(!AjI)]( b) 
0 , Pr(!AjI)  b.
Our equilibrium concept is Perfect Bayesian equilibria in pure strategies,8 with a rene-
ment. A (pure) strategy for an individual i 2 Cj is a mapping i from the set of signals
f 1;1g and feasible histories Hj to a vote vi 2 f 1;1g. Since C0 is the rst to vote,
H0 = ;, and we will write i(si;;) for i 2 C0 simply as i(si). Since C1 only votes if the
proposal wins in the rst committee, H1 = fv0 : t(v0)  r0g. We denote the strategy
prole of members of committee j by j(sj;hj)  fi(si;hj)gi2Cj, and that of all commit-
tee members by (s0;s1;h1)  (0(s0);1(s1;h1)). As the game stands, it is possible in
equilibrium that all liberals vote against the proposal independently of their information
even if they could collectively pass the proposal in both committees, simply because in this
strategy prole they are never pivotal (and therefore have no protable deviations). To rule
out these possibilities we consider the following renement of the set of equilibria. With
probability 1   , a committee member i is a moderate, and has the preferences described
above. With probability  > 0, she is a partisan and always votes her bias. Whether i
is moderate or partisan is private information. We will focus on equilibria of the game as
8While some papers in the literature take this approach, the most popular approach is to restrict the
analysis to symmetric mixed strategies. To the best of our knowledge, however, there seems to be no clear
ranking between these alternative approaches. In both cases, a \more conservative" strategy prole leads
to a \more liberal" pivotal posterior probability (more favorable for the proposal): in the case of symmetric
mixed strategies, a more conservative prole is attained by putting more probability on a vote against the
proposal following a positive signal; in the case of pure strategies, this is attained by an asymmetric strategy
prole in which some members voting against the proposal independently of their signals. We conjecture
that a version of most (and possibly all) of our results would also continue to hold for symmetric mixed
strategy proles.
7 ! 0. We say that a strategy prole () is a voting equilibrium if there exists an  > 0
such that for all  <  there exist beliefs f
i (s ijsi;hj)g such that (;) are a PBE of
the game   in pure anonymous strategies.9
4 The Strategic Problem
This section has two goals. First we formalize the notions of standard-pivotal and signal-
pivotal voting motivations that we alluded to in the introduction. We then establish a
useful transformation of the probabilities and biases in the fundamentals of the problem to
a simple counting of votes and signals that simplies considerably the analysis to follow, and
use this transformation to characterize the equilibria of our model in the single-committee
benchmark.
4.1 Standard-Pivotal and Signal-Pivotal Voting Motivations
How does the problem of voters in the sequential committee setting change vis-a-vis that
of voters in a single-committee setting ? Note rst that the strategic problem of members
of the receiving committee is exactly that of members of a single committee: they care
only about the event in which they are pivotal, and they are pivotal by being the decisive
vote in a divided committee (we call this the standard-pivotal motive). There are however
two main dierences between settings, that work together in equilibrium. First, as long
as some member of the originating committee votes following her information, the tally of
votes in the originating committee becomes a public signal, and members of the receiving
committee can condition their behavior on its realization. Second, given this, members
of the originating committee can also change the outcome by inuencing the beliefs of
members of the receiving committee regarding the relative value of the two alternatives
(we call this a signal-pivotal voting motive).
Consider rst a committee C1, which after history h1 has the sole authority over whether
to approve or reject the proposal (this might be a single committee, in which case h1 = ;,
or the receiving committee in a pair of committees moving sequentially, in which case
h1 = v0). For any i 2 C1, let v1; ijh denote the vote of all members of C1 other than i
following history h1. The vote of i inuences the outcome if and only if i is standard-pivotal
in C1 after h1; i.e., if and only if v1; ijh 2 Pi(C1;r1)  fv1; ijh : t(v1; ijh) = r1  1g. As a
9By anonymous we mean that i(si;h1
0) = i(si;h1
1) whenever h1
1 can be obtained from h0
1 by only
switching elements among lower committee members that play the same strategy.
8result, i's voting decision is determined by her preference among alternatives as evaluated
at the event Pi(C1;r1) given ; i.e., prefers the proposal over the status quo if

Pi(C1;r1)
i (si;h1)  lim
!0Pr
(jh;)(!Ajsi;Pi(C1;r1);h1)  i (1)
The fundamental dierence with respect to voting in a single committee is entirely
in the incentives of members of the originating committee, whose vote is guided by the
signal-pivotal motivation. For any vote outcome of members of C0 other than i, v0; i, let
v
 
0; i  (v0; i;vi =  1) and v
+
0; i  (v0; i;vi = +1). We say that an individual i 2 C0
is signal-pivotal at k if (i) the tally of votes of members of C0 other than i equals k, and
(ii) the proposal loses in the receiving committee if also i votes against the proposal in
C0, but wins in the receiving committee if i votes in favor of the proposal in C0; i.e., if
(v0; i;v1jv
 
0; i;v1jv
+
0; i) 2 SPi(r1;k), where
SPi(r1;k)  fv : t(v0; i) = k;t(v1jv
 
0; i)  r1   2;t(v1jv
+
0; i)  r1g
The vote of any member i 2 C0 inuences the outcome (is signal-pivotal) if and only
if i is signal-pivotal at k for some k , and in this case her voting decision is determined
by her preference among alternatives at SPi(r1)  [k2K()SPi(r1;k), where K()  fk :
SPi(r1;k) 6= ;g; i.e., prefers the proposal over the status quo if and only if

SP
i (si;r1) 
X
k2K()
lim
!0Pr
(;)(!Ajsi;SPi(r1;k))f(si;k)  i (2)
where f(si;k)  lim
!0Pr(0 i;)(si;SPi(r1;k))jsi;SPi(r1)).
Expressions (1) and (2) summarize the decision-making problem for committee members
in terms of represent the probabilities and biases in the fundamentals of the problem. It will
be useful throughout the paper to transform these expressions into equivalent expressions
written in terms of a simple counting of votes and signals. At the cost of some additional
notation, this will considerably simplify the analysis. First, let J  Cj be an arbitrary
subset of members of a committee Cj, and consider a given prole of signals sJ  fsigi2J.
Since Pr(! = !AjsJ) = Pr(! = !Ajs0
J) whenever t(sJ) = t(s0
J), we write (t(sJ)) 
Pr(! = !AjsJ).10 Second, for fsJ : t(J(sJ)) = tg 6= ;, we dene sJ(t;J)  t   tN
J,
where tN
J is the (net) tally of votes of members voting uninformatively; i.e., sJ(t;J) is
the (net) tally of signals of individuals voting informatively in J that is consistent with
10The denition of t(sJ) follows the same convention as with votes; i.e., t(sJ) 
P
i2J si.
9a vote tally t given strategy prole J if all members of J are moderates. Suppose for
example that J = f1;:::;11g, and that in  i 2 J I = f1;:::;7g votes informatively and
i 2 J N = f8;:::;11g votes against the proposal. Then with a total of ve votes against
the proposal t = 1, and sJ(1;J) = 1   ( 4) = 5, indicating that within the group of
members voting informatively, ve more of them voted for the proposal than against it.
Finally, let A and Q be the smallest integers such that b  (b) for b = A;Q respectively.
The numbers Q and (1   A) measure the intensity of the bias of conservative (liberal)
committee members in terms of the least number of positive (negative) signals that would
reverse their policy preference (from our earlier assumption, Q  2 and 1   A  2).Then
letting for any event E, L(E)  lim
!0
Pr;(Ej!Q)
Pr;(Ej!A), it follows that 11

Pi(C;r)
i (si;h) =
1
1 + L(si)L(Pi(C;r))L(h)
= (si + s i(r   1; i) + 0(h))
, where 0(h) = 0 for single committees (h = 0) and 0(h) = s0(t0(v0);0) for the case of
sequential committees (h = v0). Therefore, a conservative member of C has an incentive
to vote in favor of the proposal if and only if (si + s i(r   1; i) + 0(h))  Q, or
equivalently s i(r 1; i+0(h)+si  Q (similarly for a liberal member, substitute A).
4.2 Three Basic Results for Single-Committee Systems
We present here three basic results for single-committee settings, and an extension to the
receiving committee for sequential committees. We begin with the simplest case of a single
committee with common interests; i.e., i =  8i 2 C, and therefore denote the least
number of net positive signals that would induce any member to vote for the proposal
simply by  (without subscript). Also here and in the remainder of the paper we will follow
convention by saying that i 2 C votes informatively if vi(s;;) = s 8s, and that she votes her
bias if vi(s;;) = bi 8s. We start by pointing out a well known result due to Austen-Smith
and Banks (1996)
Proposition 1 Consider a committee composed of n members such that i =  8i =
1;:::;n, operating under a r+n
2 majority rule (z = A if and only if t(v)  r). Then
informative voting for all i is a voting equilibrium i r = .12
11Note that if E1 and E2 are independent, then Pr(!AjE1;E2) = [1 + L(E1)L(E2)] 1, and that for any
J  Cj, L(sJ :
P
i2J si = t) =

1 q
q
t
.
12The result is stated for  is odd. If  is even the condition is r =  + 1.
10As an example, with n = 11 and  = 3, we need R = 3+11
2 = 7, a 7=11 supemajority
rule. The logic behind this result is straightforward. Since all committee members vote
informatively, the net number of signals implied by standard pivotality is s i(r 1; i) =
r   1 and therefore 
Pi(C;r)
i (si) = (r   1 + si). Incentive compatibility of  requires

Pi(C;r)
i ( 1)    
Pi(C;r)
i (1), and hence (r   2)    (r). Then either r =  + 1
(if  is even) or r =  (if  is odd). On the other hand, suppose r >  + 2. Then

Pi(C;r)
i ( 1) = (r   2) > (), and hence i has incentive to deviate and vote in favor of
the proposal after a negative signal (a similar argument holds if r <    1).
More generally, in the case of a single committee with common interests, equilibria must
fall in one of two outcome-relevant classes. First, there exists a class of non-informative
equilibria in which the policy outcome is equal to the committee members' bias indepen-
dently of the private information held by members of the committee. In these equilibria
i(si) = bi 8si for some decisive majority in C (for all i in some set J  C such that
jJj  r+n
2 ). That this is in fact an equilibrium follows immediately, since in any such
strategy prole no individual is ever pivotal, and therefore there are no protable devia-
tions.13 We can typically also construct an asymmetric voting equilibrium in which some
committee members vote informatively. Intuitively, here the number of informative votes
k is chosen so that for any voting member, the information provided by the equilibrium
strategies conditional on him being pivotal exactly compensates the imbalance between the
eective rule and . 14 Consider our previous example with simple majority rule, r = 1.
Then in equilibrium k = n   (   r) = 11   2 = 9 individuals vote informatively (say
i  9), and two (here i = 10;11) vote unconditionally against the proposal. For i  9 then
 i(r   1; i) = 0   ( 2) = 2, and i wants to support the proposal if si = 1 and kill it if
instead si =  1. This example suggests that dierent dierences between r and  corre-
spond to dierent bounds on the amount of information that can be used in equilibrium.
This is in fact generally the case, as Proposition 2 shows:
Proposition 2 Consider a committee composed of n members i such that i =  8i,
()  n, operating under a r+n
2 majority rule. Then (i) there exists a unique voting
equilibrium with relevant informative voting if and only if  (n   r)    R, and (ii) the
number of informative votes in this voting equilibrium is decreasing in the dierence jr j.
13Equilibria in which i(si) =  bi 8si for all i in some decisive set J  C are ruled out due to the
existence of partisans.
14This is well known. See for example Dekel and Piccione (2000) or Persico (2004). The logic is essentially
the same as that in symmetric equilibria in mixed strategies which are often considered in the literature
(see for example Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997)).
11Proof. The proof is in the appendix.
The previous results are essentially unchanged - for the relevant population - if, as it
is the case in our main model, we introduce two groups with dierent biases; i.e., there
are nQ members with bias i = Q > q and n   nQ members with bias i = A < 1   q.
First, it is immediate to verify that given that Q > q > 1   q > A, (i) there is no
equilibrium in which both conservatives and liberals vote informatively, and that (ii) if in
a voting equilibrium i votes informatively and bi 6= bi0, then i0 must vote her bias. Note then
that informative voting by liberals can only be outcome relevant if liberals are a winning
coalition in C. Similarly, informative voting by conservatives can only be outcome relevant
if conservatives are a blocking coalition in C (we say that individuals in a a subset J of
committee C constitute a winning coalition in C, and denote this by J 2 W(C), if jJj  R.
Alternatively, J  C is a blocking coalition in C, or J 2 B(C), if jJj  n   R + 1).
Since in any equilibrium with relevant informative voting individuals voting informa-
tively must be conservatives when conservatives are a blocking coalition in C (liberals when
instead liberals are a winning coalition in C), then liberals (conservatives) vote their bias
in equilibrium and therefore just act so as to relax (tighten) the eective hurdle to passed
the proposal faced by the group of individuals voting informatively. What rests to be de-
termined is then formally equivalent to the analysis in Proposition 2 with majority rule
RD 
rD+nD
2 and committee size nD, where rD = r nA and nD = nQ when Q 2 B(C) and
rD = r+nQ and nD = nA when A 2 W(C): i.e., the number of informative votes in this vot-
ing equilibrium is decreasing in the dierence between the eective hurdle rD and the bias of
the relevant majority D. The same logic holds, moreover, if the committee is the second of
two committees moving sequentially if we incorporate the information contained in the tally
into ex-post biases 0
b(t(v0);0)  b s0(t(v0);0) for b = A;Q (note that a more favorable
public signal for the proposal makes both conservatives and liberals more liberal ex post).
Here 
Pi(C1;r1)
i (si;v0;0) = (s i(r1 1; i)+s0(t0;0)+si), and a conservative (liberal)
will vote for the proposal if and only if [s i(r1  1; i)+s0(t0;0)+si]  Q (A). Or
equivalently (focusing on conservatives) if and only if
s i(r1   1; i) + si  
0
Q(v0;0)  Q   s0(t0;0)
We summarize these results in the next Proposition.
Proposition 3 (1) Suppose Conservatives are a Blocking Coalition in C1. Then there
exists a unique voting equilibrium with relevant informative voting in  (v0) if and
only if  (R
Q
1   r
Q
1 )  0
Q(v0;0)  R
Q
1 .
12(i) If conservatives' ex post bias is suciently high (r
Q
1  0
Q(v0;0)), then ~ k0(t(v0)) 
n
Q
1   [0
Q(v0;0)   r
Q
1 ] conservatives vote informatively and all others vote their
bias.
(ii) If instead r
Q
1 > 0
Q(v0;0), then ~ k1(t(v0)) = n
Q
1   [r
Q
1   0
Q(v0;0)] + 1 conser-
vatives vote informatively and all other committee members vote in favor of the
proposal.
(2) Suppose Liberals are a Winning Coalition in C1. Then there exists a unique voting
equilibrium with relevant informative voting in  (v0) if and only if  [(R1 1) r1] 
1   0
A(v0;0)  [RA
1   (rA
1   1)].
(i) If liberals' ex post bias is suciently high ( [1 0
A(v0;0)] < rA
1 ), then ~ k1(t(v0)) =
nA
1  [rA
1  (1 0
A(v0;0))]+1 liberals vote informatively and all other committee
members vote their bias.
(ii) If instead  [1   0
A(v0;0)]  rA
1 , then ~ k0(t(v0))  nA
1   [(1   0
A(v0;0))   rA
1 ]
liberals vote informatively and all other committee members vote against the
proposal.
Note, in particular, that the number of informative votes in the receiving committee
is decreasing in the dierence between the eective hurdle r0
D for individuals voting infor-
matively in the receiving committee and their ex post bias 0
D(v0;0) after observing the
public signal s0(t0;0).
5 Main Results
Proposition 3 completely characterizes informative strategic voting in a single committee.
We turn next to the analysis of voting in sequential committees. Note that as for single
committees, here the uninformative strategy prole in which individuals in each committee
j vote unconditionally for the alternative when liberals are a winning coalition in their
committee (Aj 2 W(Cj)) and for the status quo when conservatives are a blocking coalition
in their committee (Qj 2 B(Cj)) is a voting equilibrium. In this voting equilibrium,
however, there is no transmission of information (or even more, no use of information of
any sort). We focus from here on on voting equilibria in which the equilibrium outcome
is responsive to private information; i.e., given , there exist two realizations of private
signals s;s0 2 S such that z = A under s but z = Q under s0.
13The equilibrium outcome can be responsive to private information in (broadly) three
dierent ways, and we categorize classes of equilibria accordingly. In the rst class of
equilibria, all informative voting occurs in the originating committee; the second committee
acts only to raise the hurdle that the proposal has to surpass in the rst committee to
defeat the status quo in equilibrium. We call these Endogenous Majority Rule (EMR)
voting equilibria.15 In Delegation Equilibria, instead, members of the originating committee
approve the proposal independently of their information, and all informative voting occurs
in the receiving committee. Finally, the equilibrium outcome can be responsive to private
information in both committees. In these Two-Sided Informative Voting equilibria (TSI),
the number of individuals voting informatively in the receiving committee changes with the
voting outcome in the originating committee in such a way so that the probability of success
of the proposal is strictly increasing in the tally of votes in the originating committee. We
consider each in turn.
5.1 An Endogenous Majority Rule
EMR voting equilibria is the simplest class of equilibria in which the tally of votes in the
originating committee transmits relevant information to members of the receiving commit-
tee. In equilibria of this class, the second committee acts only to modify the hurdle that
the alternative has to surpass in the rst committee to defeat the status quo in equilib-
rium (from, say, a simple majority to a two thirds majority), in such a way as to induce
informative voting by some of its members in equilibrium: the new threshold introduced
by the receiving committee \replicates" endogenously the eect of the optimal xed rule
in Austen-Smith and Banks (1996).
The main idea is the following: Suppose that the receiving committee kills the proposal -
independently of the realization of private information - for all voting outcomes in the lower
committee v0 with tally t(v0) below some critical number 0, and unconditionally approves
the proposal otherwise. For members of the initiating committee voting informatively 16,
this situation is equivalent to a unicameral system with a modied majority rule 0. In
particular, SP
i (si;r1) boils down to

SP
i (si;r1) = (s0 i(0;

0 i) + si) (3)
15Lemma 3 in the appendix shows that all voting equilibria in which all informative voting occurs in the
originating committee must be EMR voting equilibria.
16This is not necessarily the case for members of the originating committee voting uninformatively.
Recall that beliefs o the equilibrium path will be constrained by the existence of partisans. We return to
this point below.
14It follows from this and the results in section 4.2 that if we can induce members of
the relevant decisive coalition in the receiving committee to choose the cuto 0 in such a
way that the ensuing endogenous majority rule for individuals voting informatively in the
originating committee is equal to Q (if they are conservatives) or (1   A) (for liberals),
then these individuals would have an incentive to vote informatively in the rst place.17 We
show that a key determinant for existence of an EMR voting equilibrium is the \partisan"
(ideological) composition of the receiving committee, and specically whether conservatives
can or can not block the passage of the proposal in the receiving committee. When they
can, there is always an EMR voting equilibrium with k conservatives in the originating
committee voting informatively as long as the total number of conservatives in the origi-
nating committee is suciently large. When instead liberals are a winning coalition in the
receiving committee, an equilibrium of this class can only exist if liberals are a winning
coalition in both committees. Moreover, when this exists, the number of informative votes
is bounded above by the majority premium of liberals in the originating committee.
Theorem 1 (1) If conservatives can block the proposal in the receiving committee, then
there exists an EMR voting equilibrium if and only if n
Q
0 > Q. Moreover,
(i) the number of informative votes in an EMR voting equilibrium is bounded above
by n
Q
0 and 1 + Q + n0   r0, and
(ii) if in an EMR voting equilibrium i 2 C0 votes informatively, then i 2 Q0
(2) If liberals are a winning coalition in the receiving committee, then there exists an EMR
voting equilibrium if and only if 1   A 
nA
0  n
Q
0  r0
2 . Moreover,
(i) the number of informative votes in any EMR voting equilibrium is at most (nA
0  
n
Q
0 )   (1   A)   (r0   1), and
(ii) if in an EMR voting equilibrium i 2 C0 votes informatively, then i 2 A0.
Proof. The proof is in the appendix.
Theorem 1 has several implications. First, note that when conservatives are a blocking
coalition in the receiving committee there exists under some conditions - when the number of
liberals and conservatives in the originating committee is suciently large - an EMR voting
17Note that because of the existence of partisans, conservatives (liberals) in the receiving committee are
pivotal with positive probability when they are a blocking (winning) coalition in C1 and they collectively
play to pass (kill) the bill according to .
15equilibrium in which all conservatives in the originating committee vote informatively.
These conditions assure that the maximum informativeness of the aggregate public signal
for individuals in the receiving committee is larger than the bias of conservatives (n
Q
0 > Q)
and that the majority rule in the originating committee is not too demanding relative to
the size of liberals in the originating committee so as to make any tally that passes this
threshold an overwhelming positive signal for conservatives in the receiving committee
(nA
0  (r0   1)   Q).18 When liberals are a winning coalition in the receiving committee,
instead, there is no size or composition of committees, or decision rules (r0;r1), for which
all liberals in the originating committee vote informatively in an EMR voting equilibrium.
The intuition for this contrast is as follows. Suppose to the contrary that liberals
control the receiving committee and that in an EMR equilibrium all liberals in C0 vote
informatively. First, note that the relevant incentive compatibility constraint in the re-
ceiving committee is that of liberals voting against their bias for \low tallies" (i.e., for
v0 : t(v0)  0 1). Since the inference of an individual i in the originating committee can-
not be too dierent than that of a member of the receiving committee in equilibrium (see
the proof for details), members of the originating committee voting informatively must be
liberals too. Next, we show that in equilibrium conservatives in the originating committee
can't be voting against their bias (for the proposal).19 This means that they must be voting
their bias. But this is not possible either, for in this case every positive net tally would
carry favorable information for the proposal, and the liberal winning coalition (which is
already biased in favor of the proposal), would never have an incentive to vote against it.
It is now apparent why it is not a problem to construct a EMR voting equilibrium when
conservatives are a blocking coalition in the receiving committee. The same logic explains,
moreover, why it's possible to have an EMR voting equilibrium in which some liberals in
the originating committee vote informatively when liberals are a winning coalition in the
receiving committee: the asymmetry in the strategy prole of liberals in the originating
committee solves the previous problem by making unnecessary that conservatives in the
originating committee vote against their bias in order for some positive tally to transmit
unfavorable information for the proposal. This requires, however, liberals to be a winning
coalition not only in the receiving but also in the originating committee as well. Moreover,
18When conservatives vote informatively and liberals vote their bias in the originating committee, these
conditions on committee composition are equivalent to requiring that there exist tallies t0  r0 and t0
0  n0
such that t0 = t(0(s0)) and t0
0 = t(0(s0
0)) for some s0 and s0
0 and s0(t0;0) < Q < s0(t0
0;0). Note that
nA
0  (r0  1) Q is always satised under simple majority rule, in which case it is enough that n
Q
0 > Q.
19Here is relevant again the probability of individuals being partisan, which pins down beliefs of members
of the receiving committee o the equilibrium path.
16as Theorem 1 shows, the number of informative votes can never be larger than the majority
premium of liberals in C0. The theorem also shows that for an EMR voting equilibrium
where some conservatives vote informatively we need only assure that conservatives are a
blocking coalition in the receiving committee and that the number of conservatives in C0
is larger than Q.
The previous paragraph emphasizes the behavioral dierences in EMR voting equilibria
when liberals are or are not a winning coalition in the receiving committee. But there is
a also a dierence in terms of eciency of equilibria in the two cases. While EMR voting
equilibria are inherently inecient - since no information from members of the receiving
committee inuences the choice of policy - the most informative EMR voting equilibria
when conservatives are a blocking coalition in the receiving committee selects the \right"
alternative (for conservatives) almost surely as the number of conservatives and liberals
in the originating committee is suciently high (\right" here means the alternative that
conservatives would prefer if all the private information were made public). This is not
the case, however, when liberals are a winning coalition in the receiving committee, as the
number of informative votes in the most informative EMR voting equilibria is bounded
above by the majority premium of liberals in the originating committee (Proposition 4 in
the appendix makes this point formally).
5.2 Delegation to the Receiving Committee
In EMR voting equilibria, the role of members of the receiving committee is limited to
modifying the eective majority rule faced by members of the initiating committee. The
receiving committee approves the proposal when the tally of votes in the originating com-
mittee carries sucient favorable information for the proposal, and rejects it otherwise, but
does not use the private information of its members. While under some conditions this will
lead the relevant decisive majority to achieve payos close to the maximum possible attain-
able payos under perfect information, in other cases it will lead to mistakes occurring with
high probability. In this section we take a slight detour from our main objective to show
that under some conditions the relevant majority can improve upon the most informative
EMR voting equilibrium by simply delegating all relevant decision making to the receiving
committee.
The main intuition is straightforward. Suppose for concreteness that both committees
are entirely composed by liberals, and that the rst committee is small in size (say it
has three members) and the second committee is large. Then a EMR voting equilibrium
17wastes a large amount of information, and incurs in mistakes with very high probability. All
committee members would do better in this case if members of the rst committee delegated
the decision to members of the second committee by voting uninformatively in favor of the
proposal. Facing an uninformative history, members of the receiving committee could play
a strategy prole with relevant informative voting that allows much more information to
be of use (all but j(1   A)   r1j members could vote informatively). In general, the
ranking between equilibria with one-sided relevant informative voting will depend on the
composition of committees. For simplicity, we focus here on the case of simple majority rule.
We show that for simple majority rule, the relevant comparison is between the majority
premium of liberals in each committee when liberals are a winning coalition in the receiving
committee, but between the majority premium of conservatives in the receiving committee
and the total number of conservatives in the originating committee otherwise.
Consider rst the case in which liberals don't have a majority in the receiving committee.
Let 0 be an uninformative strategy prole in the originating committee with associated
vote outcome v0 and tally t(v0)  1. Then Proposition 3 implies that if (and only if) the
bias of conservatives Q is lower than the eective majority rule for conservatives when
liberals vote in favor of the proposal (R
Q
1 ), then there exists a unique voting equilibrium
with relevant informative voting in the continuation  (v0), in which k = n
Q
1  [0
Q(v0;0) 
r
Q
1 ] = n
Q
1   [Q   (1   nA
1 )] conservatives vote informatively and all other committee
members vote their bias. But then note that since passage of the proposal implies that
P
i2QI
1 si  Q, there exists a voting equilibrium in which members of the originating
committee vote in favor of the proposal uninformatively, and on the equilibrium path
members of the receiving committee play the voting equilibrium with relevant informative
voting.20 The comparison between this and the most informative EMR voting equilibrium
is now immediate. In essence, the comparison hinges between the size of the population
possibly voting informatively in a EMR voting equilibria (n
Q
0 ) and the majority premium
of conservatives in C1, n
Q
1   nA
1 .
Corollary 1 Suppose that both committees operate under simple majority rule, and that
conservatives are a blocking coalition in C1.
20Suppose that C1 members treat any deviation from 0 as uninformative (note that this should always
be the case for conservatives), and play the voting equilibrium with relevant informative voting following
any v0 such that t(v0)  r0 = 1. Note that i 2 C0's vote can only be outcome relevant if there are n0 1
2
conservative partisans - which in particular is not possible if A0 2 W(C0) - so that t0; i = 0. But then i's
vote changes the outcome if and only if almost surely
Pk
i=1 si  Q, and hence no individual in C0 prefers
to deviate and vote against the proposal.
18(i) If the number of conservatives in C0 is larger than the majority premium of conserva-
tives in C1 (i.e., n
Q
0 > n
Q
1  nA
1 ), then whenever there exists a Delegation Equilibrium
, there also exists a EMR voting equilibrium  that improves the welfare of con-
servatives vis a vis , and
(ii) for any majority premium of conservatives in C1 for which there exists a Delegation
Equilibrium  , there is a low enough n
Q
0 (n
Q
0 < n
Q
1   nA
1 + 1   Q) such that if a
EMR voting equilibrium  exists, it is dominated by  in terms of conservatives'
welfare.
Suppose on the other hand that liberals are a winning coalition in the receiving com-
mittee. Then again assuming that 0 is uninformative (and letting v0 = 0(s0) be the asso-
ciated voting outcome), Proposition 3 implies that there exists a unique voting equilibrium
with relevant informative voting in the continuation  (v0) if and only if (1 A)  RA
1  rA
1 +
1, and in this equilibrium k = nA
1  [rA
1  (1 0
A(v0;0))]+1 = nA
1  [(1+n
Q
1 ) (1 A)]+1
liberals vote informatively and all other committee members vote their bias. Here, how-
ever, inducing conservatives in the originating committee to unconditionally \defer" the
decision to the receiving committee is not always possible (at least not when they can
block the passage of the proposal in C0). A necessary and sucient condition for this is
that the bias of both conservatives and liberals are small enough relative to the size of
the receiving committee. However, when liberals are a winning coalition in the receiving
committee, whenever there exists an EMR voting equilibrium, liberals must control the
originating committee as well (and the number of informative votes in EMR voting equilib-
ria is bounded above by the majority premium in the originating committee). As a result,
the relevant comparison now is entirely between majority premiums in each committee:
Corollary 2 Suppose that both committees operate under simple majority rule, and that
A1 2 W(C1).
(i) If the majority premium of liberals in C0 is larger than in C1 (i.e., nA
0  n
Q
0 > nA
1  n
Q
1 ),
then whenever there exists a Delegation Equilibrium , there also exists a EMR voting
equilibrium  that improves the welfare of conservatives vis a vis .
(ii) Conversely, if nA
0  n
Q
0  nA
1  n
Q
1 , then whenever there exists a EMR voting equilib-
rium , there also exists a Delegation Equilibrium , which improves the welfare
of conservatives vis a vis .
195.3 Relevant Informative Voting in Both Committees
We consider next candidate equilibria in which some members of both committees vote
informatively, restricting ourselves to proles that are monotonically responsive. Say that
the tally t(0(s0)) is informative if (i) i(s;;) = s for all s for some i 2 C0, and (ii) 9 s0
such that t(0(s0))  r0.
Denition 1 We say that a strategy prole  is a monotonically responsive voting equilib-
rium if (i) it is a voting equilibrium, (ii) t(
0(s0)) is informative, and (iii) 8 s1, t(
0(s0)) 
t(
0(s0
0)) ) t(
1(s1;s0))  t(
1(s1;s0
0)), with strict inequality for some s1;s0 and s0
0.
We start our analysis of voting equilibria with relevant two-sided informative voting
(TSI) by exploiting the implications of our results for single-committee systems to oer a
partial characterization of equilibria of this class. Having restricted the set of strategies in
this way, we then oer conditions for existence of equilibria of this class, and provide a full
characterization of these voting equilibria.
Recall rst from our analysis in section 4.2 (see Proposition 3) that for any voting
outcome v0 in the originating committee, the number of informative votes in the receiving
committee in the unique equilibrium with relevant informative voting in the continuation
game  (v0) is decreasing in the dierence between the eective hurdle r0 that individuals
voting informatively must surpass, and their ex post bias 0 after observing the public signal
s0(t0;0). Now, by monotonicity, if there is relevant informative voting in the receiving
committee following voting outcomes v0 and v0
0 in the originating committee, then there
must also be relevant informative voting in C1 following v00
0 whenever t(v0)  t(v00
0) 
t(v0
0). But - and this is the key - since the only relevant dierence for individuals in the
receiving committee between voting outcomes v0
0 and v00
0 with adjacent tallies (t(v00
0) =
t(v0
0) + 2) lies almost surely in the (dierent) realization of the signal of a member of C0
voting informatively, then s0(t(v00
0);0) s0(t(v0
0);0) = 2, and therefore also 0
D(v00
0;0) 
0
Q(v0
0;0) = 2. But then the number of individuals voting informatively in the respective
continuation games in the receiving commitee, ~ k(t(v0)), must increase or decrease linearly
with t0 and in particular must satisfy j~ k(t(v00
0))   ~ k(t(v0
0))j = 2. In fact, as Proposition
3 also shows, if ~ k(t(v0)) is increasing at some t and decreasing at t0, then t < t0, with
individuals initially switching from voting against the proposal unconditionally to voting
informatively - for tallies in some range 0 < t0 < 0 - and then from voting informatively
to voting in favor of the proposal in some range 0 < t0 < 0. We then have,
20Proposition 4 Suppose liberals (conservatives) are a winning (blocking) coalition in C1.
If  is a TSV, then there exist 0, 0 and 0 ( r0   1  0  0  0  n0 + 1), and linear
functions ~ k0(t0), ~ k1(t0) such that:
(i) ~ k0(t0(v0)) liberals (conservatives) vote informatively, all other committee members
vote against the proposal for all v0 : 0 + 1  t0(v0)  0   1, and ~ k1(t0(v0)) liberals
(conservatives) vote informatively, all other committee members vote in favor of the
proposal for all v0 : 0 + 1  t0(v0)  0   1.
(ii) Moreover, ~ k0(t0 + 2) = ~ k0(t0) + 2, and ~ k1(t0 + 2) = ~ k1(t0)   2
(iii) A decisive majority of individuals in C1 votes uninformatively against the proposal if
t0(v0) < 0 and for the proposal if t0(v0) > 0.
It follows from this, in particular, that in any voting equilibrium with relevant two-sided
informative voting there exists a set of voting outcomes in the originating committee for
which the likelihood of the proposal defeating the status quo in the receiving committee is
strictly increasing in the tally of votes in favor of the proposal in the originating committee
(as opposed to a step function under an EMR voting equilibrium). Figure 1 represents a
sketch of the probability of success of the proposal in the receiving Committee conditional
on the tally of votes in the originating committee in EMR and TSI voting equilibria (drawn
here as a continuous function for convenience only). Figure 2 shows the tally of votes in
the originating and receiving committees in simulations of TSI voting equilibria for given
sizes and compositions of committees.
Proposition 4 oers a partial characterization of a voting equilibrium with relevant two-
sided informative voting, assuming that such a voting equilibrium exists. But is it at all
possible to have a TSI voting equilibrium? We show below that this is indeed the case.
In particular, we show that for an equilibrium of this class to exist it is sucient that
conservatives form a blocking coalition in the receiving committee and that the number
of conservatives in the originating committee is suciently large. We also show, however,
that a large number of conservatives in the originating committee is a sucient but not
necessary condition, and that there also exists a TSI voting equilibrium in which each of
a small number of conservatives in the originating committee (but at least Q) votes infor-
matively when liberals are suciently numerous (moreover, this strategy prole remains an
equilibrium when voting within each committee is allowed to be sequential as well). The
main result is the following:
21Figure 1: Probability of Success of the Proposal in the Receiving Committee in EMR and
TSV voting equilibria
Figure 2: Voting Outcomes in TSI Voting Equilibria (Simulations)
22Theorem 2 Suppose that Conservatives are a Blocking Coalition in the Receiving Com-
mittee, and that n
Q
0  Q, and consider a strategy prole k
0 for members of the originating
committee in which k : Q  k  n
Q
0 conservatives vote uninformatively and all other
members vote unconditionally in favor of the proposal.
(1) If 0
Q(v0;k
0) > R
Q
1 for some vote outcome v0 such that t(v0)  r0   1, there exists a
TSI voting equilibrium in which members of the originating committee behave accord-
ing to k
0. Moreover, there exists a TSI voting equilibrium that is robust to sequential
voting within each committee.
(2.i) If also 0
Q(v0;
n
Q
0
0 ) <  (R
Q
1   r
Q
1 ) for some vote outcome v0 such that t(v0) 
r0   1, there exists a TSI voting equilibrium in which all conservatives in the
originating committee vote informatively.
(2.ii) If instead 0
Q(v0;
n
Q
0
0 )  r
Q
1 for all v0 such that t(v0)  r0   1, then there exists
a TSI voting equilibrium in which all conservatives in the originating committee
vote informatively that is robust to sequential voting within each committee.
Proof. The proof is in the appendix.
For application, note that when all conservatives in the originating committee vote
informatively, the conditions in (1) and (2.ii) can be written in terms of the composition
and size of the committees as:
n
Q
0   Q  n
A
1   r1 and n
A
0 
n
Q
1   nA
1 + r1
2
+ (r0   Q); (4)
so that a suciently large number of liberals and a small number of conservatives in the
originating committee is a sucient condition for a TSI voting equilibrium that is robust
to sequential voting within each committee in which all conservatives in the originating
committee vote informatively. Moreover, the small number of conservatives in C0 - which
ensures that 0
Q(v0;
n
Q
0
0 )  r
Q
1 whenever the proposal passes the originating committee - is
not a relevant constraint for the existence of a TSI in which some conservatives in C0 vote
informatively, for we can show that if n
Q
0   k0 conservatives in C0 vote uninformatively in
favor of the proposal, the previous analysis applies with the relabeling n0A
0 = nA
0 +(n
Q
0  k0)
and n
0Q
0 = k0 (since in this case conservatives voting uninformatively for the proposal in
C0 have no protable deviations). As a result we may conclude that
23Corollary 3 Suppose that Conservatives are a Blocking Coalition in C1, and that n
Q
0  Q.
If the number of liberals in C0 is suciently large (the relevant inequality in (4)), there exists
a TSI voting equilibrium that is robust to sequential voting within each committee.
Similarly, when all conservatives in the originating committee vote informatively, the
conditions in (1) and (2.i) can be written in terms of the composition and size of the
committees as:
n
Q
0   Q 

n1   1
2

and n
A
0 
n
Q
1   nA
1 + r1
2
+ (r0   Q) (5)
As a result we may also conclude that
Corollary 4 Suppose that Conservatives are a Blocking Coalition in C1. If the number of
liberals and conservatives in C0 is suciently large (as in (5)), there exists a TSI voting
equilibrium in which all conservatives in the originating committee vote informatively.
To see the intuition for Theorem 2, we begin by part (2.ii). So consider the problem of
an individual i 2 C0 voting informatively. Note that given the responsiveness of equilibrium
policy to the tally of votes in the originating committee in TSI voting equilibria implied by
Proposition 4, i 2 C0's vote matters not only according to whether it is necessary to pass
the proposal or not in the initiating committee (the standard-pivotal motive), but also as
a way to transmit information to members of the receiving committee (the signal-pivotal
motive). As a result, while in a voting equilibrium with one sided informative voting in the
originating committee there is only one way of being pivotal (absent name-ipping), when
individuals in the receiving committee also vote informatively this is generically no longer
the case; i.e., the set K()  fk : SPi(r1;k) 6= ;g has typically more than one element.
Now, x any voting outcome of the remaining members of the initiating committee
such that 0 + 2  t(v0; i)  0   2. For i's vote to be payo relevant, it must be that
the proposal loses against the status quo in  (v
 
0; i) but defeats it in  (v
+
0; i). But from
Proposition 4, this must be due to the vote of two members of the receiving committee who
vote uninformatively against the proposal in  (v
 
0; i) but vote informatively in  (v
+
0; i),
in response to the (almost sure) reversal of a negative signal in the originating committee
leading from t(v0; i)   1 to t(v0; i) + 1. Thus i 2 C0's equilibrium inference about the
private information of individuals voting informatively in C1 after both tallies is \not
too dierent" than the standard pivotal inference of an individual voting informatively
in C1 after a vote outcome v0 in the originating committee. But this in turn must satisfy
24s1; i(r1   1;
 i)   1  0
Q(v0;
0)  s1; i(r1   1;
 i) + 1. This implies (as we show in
Lemma 6 in the appendix) that here (Q 1+si)  lim
!0Pr(;)(!Ajsi;SPi(r1;t(v0; i))) 
(Q+si), and therefore that, conditional on any v0; i with a tally in (0;0), a conservative
in the originating committee has incentives to vote informatively (and therefore also a
liberal in the originating committee to vote his bias).
The same is true therefore in expectation if all possible voting outcomes in the originat-
ing committee have tallies in 0+2  t0 i(v0 i)  0 2. So suppose that in fact liberals in
C0 vote their bias, and (all) conservatives in C0 vote informatively. Proposition 3 showed
that there can only exist a voting equilibrium with informative voting in a continuation
 (v0) if 0
Q(v0;0)  R
Q
1 , or equivalently s0(t0(v0);0)  Q 

n
Q
1  nA
1 +r1
2

. Lemma 5 in the
appendix shows that if given 0, this inequality holds as an equality for a t0(v0) such that
r0   1  t0(v0)  n0   1, then we can always nd 0 such that no individual in C0 would
want to deviate from playing according to 0 conditional on knowing t0 i(v0 i) = 0. If in
addition 0
Q(v0;0)  r
Q
1 for all v0, or equivalently s0(n0;0)   Q  nA
1   r1, then Propo-
sition 3 shows that for all feasible voting outcomes in C0, if there is a voting equilibrium in
 (v0) with informative voting, it must be that conservatives in C1 who are voting uninfor-
matively are voting against the proposal (i.e., for all feasible v0 i, t0 i(v0 i)  0   1). In
terms of the composition and size of the committees, the previous conditions can be written
as in (4). Our previous argument then suggests that if conditions (4) hold, there will exist
a voting equilibrium with relevant two-sided informative voting in which all conservatives
in the originating committee vote informatively.
Note moreover, that we have argued above that conservatives in the originating com-
mittee have incentives to vote informatively not only in expectation but also conditional
on any v0 i with a tally in (0;0). But together with the results of Dekel and Piccione
(2000) this directly implies that the previous strategy prole is also a voting equilibrium
for sequential voting within each committee (as are voting equilibria with one sided infor-
mative voting). The intuition for this result is that since in a static equilibrium players
best respond to beliefs that are conditional on them being pivotal, and all committee mem-
bers playing informatively are equally informative, observing the identity of who voted
for or against the status quo only allows players to distinguish between payo equivalent
events, and doesn't add valuable information. The same logic applies that applies in the
single-committee setting applies here as well because even if in principle there are multiple
possibly non payo-equivalent pivotal events for members of the originating committee, the
construction of TSI voting equilibria in part (2.ii) of Theorem 2 implies that informative
voting is a best response not only in expectation but also ex post for any one of these
25events.
These results, however, hold for committee compositions that assure that 0
Q(v0;
n
Q
0
0 ) 
r
Q
1 whenever the proposal passes the originating committee so that in the equilibrium with
informative voting in the receiving committee following v0 conservatives voting uninforma-
tively vote against the proposal. When this is not the case, the ex-post incentive compat-
ibility of a conservative voting informatively in the originating committee conditional on
0 +2  t(v0; i)  0  2 can't be guaranteed, and neither can therefore the existence of a
TSI voting equilibria that is robust to sequential voting within each committee.21 If on the
other hand we relax the requirement, then it is not necessary for the behavior prescribed
by 0 to be incentive compatible conditional on each feasible t(v0; i), and it is enough
instead to provide incentives to members of C0 in expectation. Part (2.i) of Theorem 2
then shows that if 0
Q(v0;
n
Q
0
0 ) <  (R
Q
1  r
Q
1 ) for a vote outcome that passes the originating
committee - or equivalently, when all conservatives in C0 vote informatively, if the number
of conservatives is suciently large, as in (5) - we can (generically) choose 0 and 0 so
that 0 is incentive compatible in expectation.
Theorem 2 establishes sucient conditions for the existence of a TSI voting equilibrium.
While a complete characterization of the set of TSI voting equilibria is beyond the scope
of this paper, we close this section with a negative result. We show that if we require TSI
voting equilibria to be robust to sequential voting within each committee, then if liberals
are a winning coalition in the receiving committee, liberals must also be a winning coalition
in the originating committee for a TSI voting equilibrium to exist. For completeness, we
also provide a sucient condition for existence of an equilibrium of this class when liberals
are a winning coalition in the receiving committee. The condition requires the majority
premium of liberals in the originating committee nA
0   n
Q
0   r0 to be small enough.22
Proposition 5 Suppose that liberals are a winning coalition in the receiving commitee.
Then there exists a TSI voting equilibrium that is robust to sequential voting within each
committee only if A0 2 W(C0). Moreover, provided that
nA
0  n
Q
0  r0
2  (1   A) + rA
1 , there
exists an equilibrium of this class with
nA
0  n
Q
0  r0
2 informative votes in the originating com-
mittee.
21Lemma 6 shows that for 0 + 2  t0 i(v0 i)  0   2,
(Q + si)  lim
!0
Pr(;)(!Ajsi;SPi(r1;t0 i(v0 i)))  (Q + 1 + si)
22Recall that liberals are a winning coalition in committee j if nA
j  Rj =
nj+rj
2 , nA
j   n
Q
j   rj  0
26Proof. The proof is in the appendix.
The role of the requirement that the voting equilibrium be robust to sequential voting
within each committee is to assure that only liberals vote informatively in the originating
committee, as we have not proved that this must be the case in TSI when incentives can
hold only in expectation. As such, it is not necessary for the result, and other assumptions
(such as the \disagreement" between liberals and conservatives being suciently large, as
expressed in A and Q) would also lead to the same result.
6 Discussion
In this paper, we develop a simple model of strategic voting in sequential committees in a
common value setting with incomplete information. The model has stark empirical impli-
cations for the analysis of voting in bicameral legislatures, as well as for the interactions
between (standing) committees and the oor of legislative bodies and a variety of simi-
lar institutional settings in universities and business. It also oers suggestive results for
the analysis of sequential electoral systems such as the US presidential election, and se-
quential referenda such as the one conducted for the ratication of the proposed european
constitution.
The model accounts for the basic stylized fact that the outcome of the vote in the rst
committee typically inuences the outcome of the vote in the second committee beyond the
binary decision of whether to approve or reject the alternative in the rst committee: higher
tallies in the rst committee are associated with higher success rates of the alternative in the
second committee. We show that this can happen in one of two ways, with the probability
of success of the alternative in the receiving committee being either a \smooth" strictly
increasing function of the tally of votes in the originating committee, or a step function, in
which the proposal is killed for low tallies in the rst committee and approved otherwise.
We emphasize three main results. First, we show that the receiving committee can act
as to modify the eective majority rule for the originating committee, inducing informative
voting by some of its members in equilibrium. This is an important feature in settings in
which the voting rules do not adjust from issue to issue to the optimal rule  a la Austen-Smith
and Banks (1996). A key determinant of whether this can in fact occur in equilibrium is the
\partisan" composition of the receiving committee, and in particular whether conservatives
(biased for the status quo) can block the passage of the proposal in the receiving committee.
Second, we show that under some conditions voting equilibria with relevant informative
27voting in the receiving committee are dominated (for members of the relevant decisive
coalition) by equilibria in which all relevant informative voting takes place in the receiving
committee, after the alternative is passed unconditionally in the originating committee.
Finally, we provide conditions for the existence of an equilibrium with relevant informative
voting in both committees, and provide a partial characterization of equilibria of this class.
In contrast to voting equilibria with one-sided relevant informative voting in the originating
committee (EMR), we show that in voting equilibria with relevant two-sided informative
voting (TSI) the conditional probability of the alternative being chosen is strictly increasing
in the tally of votes in the originating committee. Moreover, the number of individuals
voting informatively in the receiving committee decreases with the dierence between the
eective majority rule faced by individuals voting informatively in the receiving committee
and their eective bias (to evaluate additional information) following a voting outcomes in
the originating committee.
We close with two remarks about the model. First, note that while our model assumes
that members of the originating and receiving committee receive signals with the same
precision, in some circumstances (e.g., committee-oor) it would be desirable to allow for
a lower precision of signals of members of the receiving committee. This is, however, a
straightforward extension of the previous framework, and all our results continue to hold
with minor amendments in this case. A more challenging objection is the possibility of
deliberation prior to the vote, which our model ignores completely. We can of course
interpret the model as a description of the environment after such communication took
place. The question in this case is whether it is plausible to assume that at this point
there would still be relevant private information, or whether instead all private information
would be transmitted by cheap talk. This will depend on the way we assume players can
communicate, and on the criteria for equilibrium selection that is used. We leave this as
an empirical question, to be considered in the application of interest. If it is, then the
vote in the receiving committee should be independent of the outcome of the vote in the
originating committee, and behavior in line with the central stylized fact would be due to
factors other than the ones considered in this paper. The testable implications developed in
this paper will hopefully contribute to disentangle alternative explanations, and ultimately
to aid our understanding of decision-making in committees.
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Proof of Proposition 2. We rst show that , given by (i) 
i(si) = si for i  k, and (ii)

i(si) =  1 for i  k+1, is a voting equilibrium if and only if k = n ( r) and r    R.
Note rst that s i(r 1;
 i) = r 1+n k, and therefore 
Pi(C;r)
i (si) = (r 1+n k+si).
Incentive compatibility then requires 
Pi(C;r)
i ( 1) = (r+n k  2)    (r+n k) =

Pi(C;r)
i (1). By denition of  then either k = n+(r ) 1 or k = n+(r ). Proceeding
similarly, we can show that the incentive constraint for i  k + 1 implies k  n   (   r).
Feasibility requires k  n, and relevant informative voting (that z = A for some s) that
k  R. With k = n ( r), these imply that r    R. It then follows that this strategy
prole is a voting equilibrium i k = n   (   r) and r    R. Similarly, we can show
that  such that (i) 
i (si) = si for i  k, and (ii) 
i (si) = 1 for i  k + 1 is a voting
equilibrium if and only if k = n+1 (r ) and  (n r)    r 1. The result follows,
since a voting equilibrium with informative voting must be of one of these classes.
Proof of Theorem 1. The proof follows from Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 below.
Lemma 1 If A1 2 W(C1), then for any k such that (1   A) + 1  k  (nA
0   n
Q
0 )   (1  
A) (r0 1), there exists an EMR voting equilibrium characterized by the pair (k;0(k)) =
(k;(nA
0   k)   n
Q
0   (1   A)) if and only if (1   A) 
nA
0  n
Q
0  r0
2 .
Proof of Lemma 1. First we prove that if  is a EMR voting equilibrium when
A1 2 W(C1), then it must be the case that conservatives in C0 are voting their bias, and
liberals are playing a k-informative strategy prole with liberal bias. So suppose then that
 is a EMR voting equilibrium. Then there exists an (even) integer 0, r0 1  0  n0 1,
such that t(
1(s1;
0(s0)))  r1   1 8s1 whenever t(
0(s0))  0   1. This implies, in
particular, that for any v0 = 
0(s0) such that t(v0)  0   1 there is a i 2 A1 such
that 
i(t(v0);1) =  1. Now given that a R1-majority is voting against the proposal
independently of their signals, then 
Pi(C1;r1)
i (si;v0) = (s0(t(v0);
0) + si), and therefore
incentive compatibility for i 2 A1 following v0 = 
0(s0) such that t(v0)  0   1 requires
(s0(t(v0);
0) + 1)  A, or equivalently that s0(0   1;
0)  A   2.
Next we argue that if i 2 Q0, then i doesn't vote informatively. Suppose to the contrary
that for some i 2 Q0, i(;;si) = si. Since in a EMR voting equilibrium SP
i (si;r1) =
(s0; i(0;
0; i) + si), for incentive compatibility we need either s0; i(0;0; i) = Q or
s0; i(0;0; i) = Q   1. But then s0(0   1;0)  s0; i(0;0; i)   1  Q   2 >  1 
A   2, which is a contradiction since we have established that s0(t0;0)  A   2 for all
29t0  0   1. Then there must exist an i 2 A0 who is voting informatively. From this it
follows that in equilibrium conservatives in C0 must vote their bias; i.e., i(si) =  1 for all
si 8 i 2 Q0.
To see this note that since some liberal is voting informatively, no conservative can be
voting informatively as well. Now suppose that at least one conservative in C0 is voting
for A, and let tN
0 the net tally of conservatives and liberals voting uninformatively in C0.
Then s0(t0) = t0   tN
0 . Now suppose i 2 Q0 voting for A according to  deviates and
votes for Q. Conditional on reaching C1, i is taken as a partisan. The deviation therefore
only matters if t0; i = r0   1 (and it does matter here, since the outcome following v0
such that t0; i = r0 is A with positive probability). This is a protable deviation for i i
(s0; i(r0   1)   1) = (r0   1   (tN
0   1)   1)  (Q   1) , r0  Q + tN
0 . So assume
instead that r0 > Q + tN
0 . For liberals in C1 to vote for Q following t0 = 0   1 we need
s0(0   1)   (1 +(1   A)) , 0  tN
0   (1   A). For a liberal voting informatively not
to have incentives to deviate we need (s0; i(0)   1)  A  (s0; i(0) + 1), and from
this it follows that in fact 0 = tN
0  (1 A). But since we have assumed that r0 > Q+tN
0 ,
then r0 > 0 + 1, which is a contradiction with our hypothesis that 0  r0   1.
Thus in equilibrium conservatives in C0 must vote their bias. Moreover, from this it
follows that if i 2 A0 is not voting informatively, she must be voting her bias, for otherwise,
letting k denote the number of liberals voting informatively, s0(t0;0) = t0 +n
Q
0 +nA
0  k,
and thus s0(0  1;0)  A  2 , 0  k n0  (1 A) < r0. EMR voting equilibria for
A1 2 W(C1) can then be characterized, provided they exist, by pairs (k,0(k)) such that
(i) i(s;v0) =  1 (= 1) 8i 2 C1, 8v0 = 0(s0) such that t(v0)  0   1 ( 0 + 1), (ii)
i(s;;) =  1 8 i 2 Q0, and (iii)
i(s;;) = s 8i 2 A
I
0(k)  fi 2 C0 : bi = 1;i  kg
i(s;;) = 1 8i 2 A
N
0 (k)  fi 2 C0 : bi = 1;i > kg
Note then that t((s0)) =  n
Q
0 + (nA
0   k) +
P
i2AI
0(k) si, so that s0(t0;0) = t0 +
n
Q
0   (nA
0   k), and similarly s0; i(t0; i;0; i) = t0; i + n
Q
0   (nA
0   k). Since SP
i (si;r1) =
(s0; i(0;
0; i) + si), for incentive compatibility we need either s0; i(0;0; i) = A or
s0; i(0;0; i) = A   1. Together with s0(0   1;
0)  A   2, this implies that
0(k) = (n
A
0   k)   n
Q
0   (1   A) (6)
Since we need 0(k)  r0   1, then k  (nA
0   n
Q
0 )   [(1   A) + (r0   1)] (which implies
nA
0  R0). Since on the equilibrium path nA
0   n
Q
0   2k  t0  nA
0   n
Q
0 , and thus we
30need nA
0   n
Q
0   2k + 1  0(k)  nA
0   n
Q
0   1, then k  1 + (1   A). There exists a
k satisfying these two inequalities if and only if (1   A) 
nA
0  n
Q
0  r0
2 . To show that 
is a voting equilibrium for k : 1 + (1   A)  k  (nA
0   n
Q
0 )   [(1   A) + (r0   1)] and
0(k) = (nA
0   k)   n
Q
0   (1   A) it only remains to show that members of the originating
committee that don't vote informatively do not have protable deviations. Note that these
deviations produce histories that have zero probability. Suppose then that members of
the receiving committee treat these deviations as informative: if i 2 AN
0 votes against the
proposal then j 2 C1 believes si =  1, similarly for i 2 Q0. Note that 
1 is consistent with
these beliefs. Note that if i 2 AI
0, and j 2 AN
0 , then s0; j(t;0; j) = s0; i(t;0; i)+1, and
if ` 2 Q0, then s0; `(t;0; j) = s0; i(t;0; i)   1. It follows from these and the fact that
i 2 AI
0 doesn't have a protable deviation, that no player wants to deviate.
Lemma 2 If Q1 2 B(C1), there exists an EMR voting equilibrium with k informative votes
(1 + Q  k  n
Q
0 ) if and only if  (n0   r0   k)  1 + Q  n
Q
0 . If all individuals voting
uninformatively in C0 vote their bias then there exists an EMR voting equilibrium with k
informative votes (1 + Q  k  n
Q
0 ) if and only if n
Q
0  1 + Q and nA
0  (r0   1)   Q.
Proof of Lemma 2. Proceeding exactly as in the proof of Lemma 1 we can establish
that in a EMR voting equilibrium (i) s0(0 + 1;
0)  Q + 1, (ii) i 2 A0 doesn't vote
informatively, and (iii) there exists i 2 Q0 who votes informatively. Equilibrium does not
pin down from this the behavior of liberals or conservatives voting uninformatively in C0,
and as a result for equilibrium purposes we are only concerned in C0 with the incentive
compatibility constraints of individuals voting informatively.23 Now denote the net tally
of liberals in C0 by tA
0 , and the net tally of conservatives voting uninformatively in C0
when 0 contains k informative votes by t
QN
0 (k). Then s0(t0;
0) = t0   tA
0   t
QN
0 (k),
and therefore (i) above implies 0  tA
0 + t
QN
0 + Q. Incentive compatibility of  for
i 2 Q0 requires (s0; i(0;
0; i)   1)  Q  (s0; i(0;
0; i) + 1), and therefore either
s0; i(0;0; i) = Q or s0; i(0;0; i) = Q 1, which together with the previous inequality
imply 0 = tA
0 +t
QN
0 +Q. For feasibility we need r0 1  0  n0 1 and tA
0 +t
QN
0 (k) k+1 
0  tA
0 + t
QN
0 (k) + k   1, or equivalently maxfr0   1   tA
0   t
QN
0 (k);1   kg  Q  k   1.
This results in two relevant inequalities: k  1+Q (which implies the necessary condition
23The deviations of individuals voting uninformatively are (when they are supposed to vote against their
bias) or can be made to be (when they are supposed to vote for their bias) uninformative, and as a result
only matter in the event that t0 i = r0   1, but then never, since independently of their vote here the
outcome is Q for sure.
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Q
0  1 + Q) and
Q  r0   1   t
A
0   t
QN
0 (k) (7)
Note that the right hand side of (7) is minimized when all individuals voting uninformatively
in C0 vote for A, in which case this becomes Q  r0 1 n0+k, so the maximum number of
individuals voting informative is (k ) Q+n0 (r0 1). Note that if instead conservatives
in C0 voting uninformative vote their bias, (7) becomes k  n
Q
0  nA
0 +(r0 1) Q. That is,
in this case we need k  maxf1+Q;n
Q
0  nA
0 +(r0 1) Qg, and therefore the necessary
and sucient conditions for the existence of a EMR voting equilibrium with any number
1 + Q  k  n
Q
0 of conservatives voting informatively and the remaining conservatives
voting their bias uninformatively is that n
Q
0  1 + Q and nA
0  (r0   1)   Q.
Lemma 3 All voting equilibria with relevant informative voting only in the originating
committee must be EMR voting equilibria.
Proof of Lemma 3. Suppose not. Then there are at least two cutpoints in the
receiving committee. If all of these are below the cutpoint of the EMR voting equilibrium,
the IC of members of the originating committee voting informatively would be violated.
The same would occur if all the cutpoints are above the cutpoint of the EMR voting
equilibrium. Then at least one cutpoint must be below and one above `. But then the IC
of members of the relevant majority in the receiving committee must be violated in some
continuation.
To state Lemma 4 formally, we need to develop some terminology. We say that 
produces an optimal policy for individuals with bias b given a realization of signals s, and
denote this by O
b(s) = 1, if t(0)  r0 and t1(1(s1;0))  r1 , t(s)  b. Otherwise
we let Ob(s;) = 0. That is, we dene the mapping Ob(;) : S ! f0;1g by Ob(s;) = 1
if t(0)  r0 and t1(1(s1;0))  r1 , t(s)  b, and Ob(s;) = 0 otherwise. Let
Ob() 
P
s:Ob(s;)=1 Pr(s) denote the probability that  produces an optimal policy for
individuals with bias b. Given a committee C0, let C0 denote the set of uninformative
and EMR voting equilibria, and let C0 denote the most informative equilibrium in C0.
Let C(k)  fn
Q
0 (k);nA
0 (k);n
Q
1 (k);nA
1 (k)g. We say that a sequence of committees fC(k)gk
is increasing if nb
j(k + 1) > nb
j(k) 8k, j = 0;u and b = Q;A. We say that a sequence of
committees is liberal (conservative) if A1(k) 2 W(C1(k)) (Q1(k) 2 B(C1(k))) 8k. Then
32Lemma 4 (i) For any " > 0 and increasing sequence of conservative committees fC(k)gk,
there exists a k such that if k  k, jOb(Ck)   1j < ". However, (ii) there exists an " > 0
and an increasing sequence of liberal committees fC(k)gk such that jOb(Ck)   1j > " 8k.
Proof of Lemma 4. For (ii), it is enough to note that if along a sequence n
Q
0 (k) 
nA
0 (k), the most informative voting equilibrium is the non-informative equilibrium. The
result follows, since we can always nd an increasing sequence of committees with this
property. For (i), note rst that there is always a k+ such that the strategy prole 
in part (i) of Theorem 1 is a voting equilibrium. Therefore for k  k+, 
C0 is the most
informative equilibrium in C0. Now
Pn
i=1 si  Q ,
Pn
i=1 s
+
i 
n+Q
2 , 1
n
Pn
i=1 s
+
i 
1
2 +
Q
2n. So suppose that ! = !A. Conditional on !A, signals are i.i.d. Bernoulli(q) random
variables. The strong law of large numbers then implies that Pr(limn!1
1
n
Pn
i=1 s
+
i =
q) = 1, and therefore (since q > 1=2) that Pr(limn!1

1
n
Pn
i=1 s
+
i  
 
1
2 +
Q
2n

 0) = 1.
However, it also implies that Pr(limn
Q
0 !1
h
1
n
Q
0
P
i2Q0 s
+
i  
 
1
2 +
Q
2n
i
 0) = 1. Therefore
for large committees, conditional on ! = !A, both optimality for conservatives and the
most informative equilibrium in C0 choose A with probability 1. A similar argument can
be made with ! = !Q. This completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 2. We begin with (2.ii); i.e., we show that if 0
Q(v0;k
0) > R
Q
1 for
some vote outcome v0 such that t(v0)  r0   1, and also 0
Q(v0;
n
Q
0
0 )  r
Q
1 for all v0 such
that t(v0)  r0   1 then there exists a TSI voting equilibrium in which all conservatives
in the originating committee vote informatively that is robust to sequential voting within
each committee.
(2.ii.a) First note that if all conservatives vote informatively in the originating com-
mittee, then the conditions in the hypothesis boil down to (4) as discussed in the text.
By Proposition 4, we know that if a TSI voting equilibrium  exists, then it must be that
there exist 0, 0 and 0 ( r0   1  0  0  0  n0 + 1), and ~ k0(t0), ~ k1(t0) such
that for all v0 : 0 + 1  t(v0)  0   1, ~ k0(t(v0)) conservatives vote informatively and
all other committee members vote their bias, and for all v0 : 0 + 1  t(v0)  0   1,
~ k1(t(v0)) conservatives vote informatively and all other committee members vote in favor
of the proposal. By Proposition 3, these strategy proles are equilibria in  (v0) for all
v0 : 0 +1  t(v0)  0  1 if and only if ~ k0(t0) = r1 +n
Q
1  nA
1  Q +(t0  nA
0 ) and (from
feasibility and relevant informative voting)
Q + n
A
0  
(n
Q
1   nA
1 + r1)
2
 0 + 1  0   1  n
A
1 + Q + n
A
0   r1 (8)
33, and are equilibria in  (v0) for all v0 : 0 + 1  t(v0)  0   1 if and only if ~ k1(t0) =
Q + n1   (r1   1)   (t0   nA
0 ) and (from feasibility and relevant informative voting)
n
A
1 + Q + n
A
0   r1 + 1  0 + 1  0   1  Q + n
A
0 +
n1   r1
2
(9)
We want to show that there exist r0   1  0  0  0  n0 + 1 satisfying (8) and (9)
when relevant such that (Q   1 + si)  SP
i (si;r1)  (Q + si), eliminating protable
deviations for i 2 Q0, where SP
i (si;r1) is given by (2) with K() = fk : 0  k  0g; i.e.,

SP
i (si;r1) =
0 X
k=0
lim
!0Pr
(;)(!Ajsi;SPi(r1;k))f(si;k) (10)
(2.ii.b) Let 0 = Q+nA
0  
(n
Q
1  nA
1 +r1)
2  1, and let 0 = 0 = n0+1. Let i(v0;si) =  1
for all si, for all i 2 C1 for all v0 : t(v0)  0   1. The conditions nA
0 
n
Q
1  nA
1 +r1
2 +
(r0   Q) and n
Q
0   Q  0 imply, respectively, that 0  r0   1, and 0  n0   1. By
Lemma 5, lim
!0
Pr(;)(!Ajsi;SPi(r1;0) = (Q   1 + s0
i). By Lemma 6, (Q   1 + s0
i) 
lim
!0Pr(;)(!Ajsi;SPi(r1;^ t0))  (Q + s0
i) for all v0; i : t(v0; i) = ^ t0, with 0 + 2 
^ t0  0   2. But then we are done, since n
Q
0   Q  nA
1   r1 implies - noting that
~ k0([nA
1 +nA
0 +Q  (r1  1)] 1) = n
Q
1 - that for all tallies on the equilibrium path t(0(s0)
(and in fact for all feasible tallies), t(0(s0))  0   1.
(2.ii.c) That this voting equilibrium is robust to sequential voting within each committee
follows since by Lemma 5 and Lemma 6 members of the originating committee have no
incentives to deviate even ex post, i.e., for any realization of votes of members of the
receiving commitee. Thus the argument in Dekel and Piccione (2000) for single-committees
works equally well here. Part (1) now also follows immediately after noting that if instead of
all conservatives voting informatively in C0 as in (2.ii) now n
Q
0  k0 conservatives in C0 vote
uninformatively in favor of the proposal, the previous analysis applies with the relabeling
n0A
0 = nA
0 + (n
Q
0   k0) and n
0Q
0 = k0 since in this case conservatives voting uninformatively
for the proposal in C0 have no protable deviations.
(2.i) As for (2.ii) above, rst note that if all conservatives vote informatively in the
originating committee, then the conditions in the hypothesis boil down to (5) as discussed
in the text. Repeat now step (2.ii.a) above. Next let i(v0;si) =  1 (=1) for all si, for all
i 2 C1 for all v0 : t(v0)  0 1 ( 0+1). Let 0 = Q+nA
0  
(n
Q
1  nA
1 +r1)
2  1. As before, the
conditions nA
0 
n
Q
1  nA
1 +r1
2 +(r0 Q) and n
Q
0  Q  0 imply, respectively, that 0  r0 1,
and 0  n0 1. By Lemma 5, lim
!0Pr(;)(!Ajsi;SPi(r1;0) = (Q 1+s0
i). Now if n
Q
0  
34Q  nA
1  r1, we know that the result holds by part (2.ii). Therefore assume to the contrary
that nA
1   r1 + 2  n
Q
0   Q, so that maxs0 t(0(s0))  0 + 1 for all 0 satisfying (8). Let
0 = nA
1 +nA
0 +Q (r1 1). By Lemma 6, (Q 1+s0
i)  lim
!0Pr(;)(!Ajsi;SPi(r1;^ t0)) 
(Q + s0
i) for all v0; i : t(v0; i) = ^ t0, with 0 + 2  ^ t0  0   2. We now show that there
exists a 0  0 satisfying (9) such that (Q 1+si)  SP
i (si;r1)  (Q+si), eliminating
deviations for i 2 Q0. In what follows we will make explicit the dependency of SP
i (si;r1)
on 0 in  by writing SP
i (si;r1;0) (here we x 0 and 0 at the values specied above).
First note that if 0 = 0 = nA
1 +nA
0 +Q (r1 1), then SP
i (si;r1;0)  (Q+si). To
see this note that since Q loses against A independently of s1 in  (v
+
0; i), L(SPi(r1;0)) =
L(t(v1jv
 
0; i)  r1   2) = L(
Pn
Q
1
j=1 sj  r1   2   nA
1 ) 

1 q
q
(r1 2 nA
1)
by Lemma 7.
Since also s0; i(0;
0; i) = nA
1 + Q   (r1   1), and thus L(v0; i : t(v0; i) = 0) =

1 q
q
nA
1 +Q (r1 1)
, we have lim
!0Pr(;)(!Ajsi;SPi(r1;^ t0))  (Q + si   1).
If also SP
i (si;r1;0)  (Q+si 1), then we are done. So suppose not. Then in equi-
librium 0  0+2. Since ~ k0(0 1) = n
Q
1 and ~ k1(0+1) = n
Q
1  1, t(
1(s1;v
 
0; i))  r1 2
and t(
1(s1;v
+
0; i))  r1 only if
Pn
Q
1
i=1 si = r1 2 nA
1 . Then L(SPi(r1;0)) =

1 q
q
r1 2 nA
1
,
which with L(v0; i : t(v0; i) = 0) =

1 q
q
nA
1 +Q r1+1
gives lim
!0Pr(;)(!Ajsi;SPi(r1;0)) =
(Q   1 + s0
i).
Now, by Lemma 6, (a) for all v0; i : t(v0; i) = ^ t0 such that 0+2  ^ t0  0 2, we have
(Q+s0
i)  lim
!0Pr(;)(!Ajsi;SPi(r1;^ t0))  (Q+1+s0
i), but (b) for all v0; i : t(v0; i) =
^ t0 such that 0 + 2  ^ t0  0   2 instead (Q   1 + s0
i)  lim
!0Pr(;)(!Ajsi;SPi(r1;^ t0)) 
(Q+s0
i). Together with the fact that (by Lemma 7) lim
!0Pr(;)(!Ajsi;SPi(r1;0)) is also
increasing in 0, this implies that SP
i (si;r1;0) is strictly increasing in 0 for 0  0 + 2.
Finally, note that if we choose
0 = Q + n
A
0 + 1 +

n1   r1
2

(11)
and this is feasible, in the sense that 0 = Q + nA
0 +
 
n1+1
2

 n0 + 1 (which is assumed
true in the hypothesis), then lim
!0Pr(;)(!Ajsi;SPi(r1;0)) = (Q + si). This follows
since L(SPi(r1;0)) = L(t(v1jv
 
0; i)  r1   2), and according to , t(
1(s1;v
 
0; i)) =
nA
1 + [n
Q
1   ~ k1(0   1)] +
P~ k1(0 1)
j=1 sj  r1   2 ,
P~ k1(0 1)
j=1 sj  Q + nA
0   0, but
35P~ k1(0 1)
j=1 sj   ~ k1(0 1) =  Q n1 nA
0 +0+r1 2. Therefore with 0 as in (11), we have
L(SPi(r1;0)) =

1 q
q
Q+nA
0  0
, and hence lim
!0Pr(;)(!Ajsi;SPi(r1;0)) = (Q + si).
Therefore (Q   1 + si)  SP
i (si;r1;0)  (Q + 1 + si). But then there exists a 0:
nA
1 +nA
0 +Q (r1 1)  0  Q+nA
0 +
 
n1+1
2

such that (Q 1+si)  SP
i (si;r1;0) 
(Q + si).
Lemma 5 Let Q1 2 B(C1). Suppose that  is a TSI voting equilibrium and that i 2 C0
votes informatively. Let 0 = Q + nA
0  
(n
Q
1  nA
1 +r1)
2   1. Then
lim
!0Pr
(;)(!Ajsi;SPi(r1;0) = (Q   1 + s
0
i)
Proof of Lemma 5. Fix v0; i : t(v0; i) = 0. First note that since t(v
 
0; i) = 0   1,
then t(
1(s1;v
 
0; i))  r1   2 8 s1, and as a result, L(t(v1jv
 
0; i)  r1   2;t(v1jv
+
0; i) 
r1) = L(t(v1jv
+
0; i)  r1). Now according to , this is t(
1(s1;v
+
0; i)) = nA
1  [n
Q
1  ~ k0(0+
1)] +
P~ k0(0+1)
j=1 sj  r1, or equivalently,
P~ k0(0+1)
j=1 sj  (n
Q
1   nA
1 + r1)   ~ k0(0 + 1). But
P~ k0(0+1)
j=1 sj  ~ k0(0 + 1). We now choose 0 + 1 so that z = A following 0 + 1 is only
consistent, according to , with ~ k0(0 + 1) =
(n
Q
1  nA
1 +r1)
2 positive signals:
0 = Q + n
A
0  
(n
Q
1   nA
1 + r1)
2
  1 (12)
As a result, t(
1(s1;v
+
0; i))  r1 , s1 2
n
s1 : t(s1) =

n
Q
1  nA
1 +r1
2
o
, and therefore we
have L(t(v1jv
+
0; i)  1) =

1 q
q

 
nQ
1  nA
1 +r1
2
!
. Next, note that s0; i(t;
0; i) = t   nA
0 ,
so that s0; i(0;
0; i) = Q  

n
Q
1  nA
1 +r1
2

  1, and therefore L(v0; i : t(v0; i) = 0) =

1 q
q
Q 
 
nQ
1  nA
1 +1
2
!
 1
. Putting these observations together we obtain the result.
Lemma 6 Let Q1 2 B(C1). Suppose that  is TSI voting equilibrium, and that i 2 C0
votes informatively.
(i) Let v0; i be a voting outcome in C0; i such that 0 + 2  t(v0; i)  0   2. Then
(Q   1 + si)  lim
!0Pr
(;)(!Ajsi;SPi(r1;t(v0; i)))  (Q + si)
36(ii) Let v0; i be a voting outcome in C0; i such that 0 + 2  t(v0; i)  0   2. Then
(Q + si)  lim
!0
Pr
(;)(!Ajsi;SPi(r1;t(v0; i)))  (Q + 1 + si)
Proof of Lemma 6. Consider part (i). Fix v0; i : t(v0; i) = ^ t0 for 0+2  ^ t0  0 2.
We know already that s0 i(t;
0; i) = t nA
0 , so that L(v0; i : t(v0; i) = ^ t0) =

1 q
q
^ t0 nA
0
.
Next note that according to , i's vote is inuential only if t(
1(s1;v
 
0; i))  r   2 and
t(
1(s1;v
+
0; i))  r. But t(
1(s1;v
 
0; i)) = nA
1   (n
Q
1   ~ k0(^ t0   1)) +
P~ k0(^ t0 1)
i=1 si  r   2, or
if and only if for some labeling of the individuals voting informatively
~ k0(^ t0 1) X
i=1
si  Q + n
A
0   ^ t0   1 (13)
Similarly t(
1(s1;v
+
0; i))  r if and only if
~ k0(^ t0+1) X
i=1
si =
~ k0(^ t0 1) X
i=1
si +
~ k0(^ t0+1) X
i=~ k0(^ t0 1)+1
si  Q + n
A
0   ^ t0   1 (14)
Since
P~ k0(^ t0+1)
i=~ k0(^ t0 1)+1 si  2, this implies that to the knowledge that
Pn
Q
0
i=1 si = ^ t0  nA
0 in
C0, we must add
P~ k0(^ t0 1) 1
i=1 si = Q+nA
0  ^ t0 2, s~ k0(^ t0+1) = 1 and (s~ k0(^ t0 1);s~ k0(^ t0 1)+1) 2
f( 1;1);(1; 1);(1;1)g (or permutations thereof). Denoting this latter event by Z, we
have
Pr(Zj!Q)
Pr(Zj!A) =
2q(1 q)+(1 q)2
2q(1 q)+q2 >
1 q
q , and therefore
Pr(Zj!Q)
Pr(Zj!A) = 
1 q
q for some  > 1. Thus
lim
!0Pr
(;)(!Ajsi;SPi(r1;^ t0)) =
1
1 + 

1 q
q
Q+si =
1
1 +

1 q
q
Q+si x
for some x 2 (0;1). Equivalently, lim
!0Pr(;)(!Ajsi;SPi(r1;^ t0)) = (Q+si x) for some
x 2 (0;1), which implies the claim. Part (ii) follows from the same argument, noting that
inequalities (13) and (14) become
P~ k1(^ t0 1)
i=1 si  Q+nA
0  ^ t0 and
P~ k1(^ t0+1)
i=1 si  Q+nA
0  ^ t0.
Lemma 7 (i) Pr(!Aj
Pk
i=1 si  k A) is decreasing in k and A, and (ii) Pr(!Aj
Pk
i=1 si 
k   A) < Pr(!Aj
Pk
i=1 si = k   A)
37Proof of Lemma 7. For (i), it is enough to show that
Pr(
Pk
i=1 sik Aj!Q)
Pr(
Pk
i=1 sik Aj!A) is increasing
in k and A. But this follows since
Pr(
Pk
i=1 si  k   Aj!Q)
Pr(
Pk
i=1 si  k   Aj!A)
=
Pr(js j  A
2j!Q)
Pr(js j  A
2j!A)
=
Pr(js+j  A
2j!A)
Pr(js+j  A
2j!Q)
=
Pk
t=A=2 F(t;!A)
Pk
t=A=2 F(t;!Q)
where F(t;!A) 

k
t

qt(1   q)k t and F(t;!Q) 

k
t

(1   q)tqk t, and
F(k+1;!A)=F(k+1;!Q)
F(k;!A)=F(k;!Q) =

q
1 q
2
> 1, so that
F(k+1;!A)
F(k+1;!Q) >
F(k;!A)
F(k;!Q). This also implies (ii).
Proof of Proposition 5. We sketch the argument, the details can be lled using the
steps in previous results. First, proceeding as in Lemma 6, we can show that if A1 2 W(C1),
 is a MR voting equilibrium with relevant two-sided informative voting, and i 2 C0 votes
informatively, then for any v0; i such that 0 + 2  t(v0; i)  0   2.
(A   2 + si)  lim
!0
Pr
(;)(!Ajsi;SPi(r1;t(v0; i)))  (A   1 + si)
, while for any v0; i such that 0 + 2  t(v0; i)  0   2
(A   1 + si)  lim
!0Pr
(;)(!Ajsi;SPi(r1;t(v0; i)))  (A + si)
From this it follows immediately that if  is robust to sequential voting within each com-
mittee, then only liberals in C0 can vote informatively. But then (by the same argument
as in Lemma 1, conservatives in C0 must be voting their bias, and hence if conservatives
are a blocking coalition in C0 there can't be relevant informative voting in C0. So sup-
pose next that liberals are a winning coalition in C0, and that in equilibrium k liberals
vote informatively and all other members of the originating committee vote their bias.
Note that if k 
nA
0  (n
Q
0 +r0)
2 , then t(0) =  n
Q
0 + (nA
0   k) +
Pk
i=1 si  r0 for all s0.
So assume in fact that 1  k 
nA
0  (n
Q
0 +r0)
2 (this is possible since A0 2 W(C0)). Then
s0(t0;0)   k   
nA
0  (n
Q
0 +r0)
2 for any s0, and thus by the assumption in the hypothesis
(1   A) + s0(t0;0)   (n
Q
1 + r1) for any s0 (note that for k = 1 this condition is always
satised). But this, together with Proposition 3, implies that if there is relevant informa-
tive voting in  (v0) then liberals voting uninformatively vote in favor of the proposal, or
equivalently that for any such v0; i = 0; i(s0; i), 0 + 2  t(v0; i)  0   2 (i.e., that in
equilibrium 0 = 0). If s0(t0;0) + 1   A <
nA
1  n
Q
1  r1
2 , then we are done. Otherwise, set
0 so that s0(0   1;0) + 1   A =
nA
1  n
Q
1  r1
2 .
38References
Ali, N. S., and N. Kartik (2006): \A Theory of Momentum in Sequential Voting,"
Department of Economics, UCSD.
Austen-Smith, D., and J. S. Banks (1996): \Information Aggregation, Rationality,
and the Condorcet Jury Theorem," American Political Science Review, 90, 34{45.
Austen-Smith, D., and J. Duggan (eds.) (2005): Social Choice and Strategic Deci-
sions: Essays in Honor of Jerey S. Banks.
Austen-Smith, D., and T. Feddersen (2005): \Deliberation and Voting Rules," in
Austen-Smith and Duggan (2005), pp. 269{316.
(2006): \Deliberation, Preference Uncertainty, and Voting Rules," American
Political Science Review, 100, 209{218.
Battaglini, M. (2005): \Sequential Voting with Abstention," Games and Economic
Behavior, 51, 445{463.
Battaglini, M., R. Morton, and T. Palfrey (2007): \Eciency, Equity and Timing
of Voting Mechanisms," Forthcoming, American Political Science Review.
Callander, S. (2007): \Bandwagons and Momentum in Sequential Voting," Review of
Economic Studies, 74.
Coughlan, P. (2000): \In Defense of Unanimous Jury Veredicts: Mistrials, Communica-
tion, and Strategic Voting," American Political Science Review, 94, 375{393.
Crawford, V. P., and J. Sobel (1982): \Strategic Information Transmission," Econo-
metrica, 50, 1431{1451.
Cutrone, M., and N. McCarty (2005): \Does Bicameralism Matter?," Unpublished
Article. Princeton University.
Dekel, E., and M. Piccione (2000): \Sequential Voting Procedures in Symmetric Bi-
nary Elections," Journal of Political Economy, 108, 34{54.
Feddersen, T., and W. Pesendorfer (1997): \Voting Behavior and Information Ag-
gregation in Elections With Private Information," Econometrica, 65, 1029{1058.
39(1998): \Convicting the Innocent: The Inferiority of Unanimous Jury Verdicts
under Strategic Voting," American Political Science Review, 92, 23{35.
Fey, M. (1998): \Informational Cascades and Sequential Voting," Working Paper, Uni-
versity of Rochester.
Gerardi, D., and L. Yariv (2007): \Deliberative Voting," Journal of Economic Theory,
134, 317{338.
Gilligan, T., and K. Krehbiel (1987): \Collective Decision-Making and Standing
Committees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures," Jour-
nal of Law, Economics and Organization, 3, 287{335.
Hummel, P. (2007): \Voting as Signaling in Repeated Elections," Typescript, Stanford
University.
Maug, E., and B. Yilmaz (2002): \Two Class Voting: A Mechanism for Conict Reso-
lution," American Economic Review, 92, 1448{1471.
Meirowitz, A., and K. W. Shotts (2007): \Pivots Versus Signals in Elections," Type-
script.
Oleszek, W. J. (2004): Congressional Procedures and the Policy Process. Congressional
Quarterly Inc., Washington, D.C.
Persico, N. (2004): \Committee Design with Endogenous Information," Review of Eco-
nomic Studies, 71, 165{191.
Piketty, T. (2000): \Voting as Communicating," Review of Economic Studies, 67, 169{
191.
Razin, R. (2003): \Signaling and Election Motivations in a Voting Model with Common
Values and Responsive Candidates," Econometrica, 71, 1083{1119.
Shotts, K. (2006): \A Signaling Model of Repeated Elections," Social Choice and Wel-
fare, 27, 251{261.
Tsebelis, G., and J. Money (1997): Bicameralism. Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge, UK.
40Wit, J. (1997): \Herding Behavior in a Roll-Call Voting Game," Unpublished Article,
University of Amsterdam.
41